Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions have long been and seem likely to remain objects of fascination within the world of finance. Whilst scholars puzzle over the theoretical motivations and value impacts of such transactions, practitioners devote their efforts towards the end of fuelling what has again become a burgeoning juggernaut 1 . The result of these twin streams of effort has been the creation of an unresolved though clearly important paradox.
Many researchers interested in mergers and acquisitions have expressed deep scepticism as to the fundamental rationale for undertaking acquisition transactions (Roll's "hubris hypothesis" being perhaps the best known exemplar of this trend), arguing that there would be far fewer such events if shareholder value creation was their true aim. They have also gathered large quantities of empirical evidence which at very least raises serious doubts as to the likelihood that acquisitions generate value for the buying party (Sudarsanam, 2003) . This is not to say that the literature on acquisitions does not throw up examples of acquisitions which have been apparently well motivated or which, irrespective of motivation appear nonetheless to have resulted in the generation of net increments to economic wealth for acquiring parties. Indeed, some recent analysis suggests that there are three key reasons why the results of empirical studies into the performance effects of acquisition transactions have shed such a consistently dim light on them. First, the wrong transactions were being studied -with many small transactions being excluded from the datasets being used by researchers. Second, the wrong measures of performance were being used and third, the wrong measurement timeframes were being adopted (Harding & Rovit, 2004) .
Despite the foregoing, it is not to an examination of the preconditions for value creation in acquisition transactions that this paper turns. Instead, the focus lies on transactions which lead not just to value dissipation for acquiring parties, but which result in such a profoundly negative outcome that the fact of the consummation of the transaction actually results in the onset of financial distress and potential liquidation for the newly enlarged firm. We refer to this as the killer acquisition problem.
Of course, pre-existing literature has hinted at this problem. Sirower's (1997) elegant analysis of the so called synergy trap in acquisition transactions certainly points to the issue. He conceptualises acquisitions as a special case of the capital budgeting problem, in which the question of value creation or destruction resulting from each transaction is most forcefully explained by balancing the present value of any premiums paid to effect change of control against the present value of any synergies resulting from the combination.
Viewed through this lens, were the value of the premium paid to effect an acquisition sufficiently large in the context of the financial resource base of the acquiring firm, and the synergies (if any) sufficient delayed 2 , it is possible to conceive of financial distress as one outcome for the acquiring firm. But beyond reference to excessive premium for control and lack of timely synergy realisation, this approach fails to yield a more clinical set of factors upon which to found a reasonable expectation of financial failure of the type examined here.
Similarly, though previous literature has cited a range of factors which appear to be significant in differentiating the characteristics of those acquisition transactions which fail (that is, destroy value) from those which succeed, including; relative size of target and acquirer, strategic relatedness, acquirer track record, combined entity market power, whether domestic or international and form of consideration (to produce a non exhaustive list), little attempt has been made to study factors which are likely to be associated with catastrophic outcomes for acquirers. Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by focusing on a specific under researched phenomenon, the catastrophic or killer acquisition, and the factors which are associated with such events in particular as opposed to value dissipating transactions in general. Given the lack of a substantial extant literature, a case methodology is employed as a means of yielding insights with a capacity to contribute to the development of a more theorised approach to the understanding of the phenomenon at hand (Yin, 1989) .
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two provides an overview of and background to the focal case organisation, Australian wine producer Evans & Tate Limited. Section three explores a sequence of acquisition transactions undertaken by this company, their strategic context and impact on Evans & Tate. Section four focuses in specific detail on one of these acquisitions, the company's 2003 purchase of Cranswick Premium Wines. This section of the paper outlines suggested explanations both for why the transaction itself was so dangerous and also of the particular traits of the acquiring entity which led it to pursue and consummate the deal notwithstanding its obvious risks. Section five contains a synthesis of the research and offers some conclusions in relation to the incidence of the killer acquisition phenomenon.
Overview of the Focal Company
Evans & Tate is an Australian based wine producer. The business was established by John Evans, Jan Evans, John Tate and Toni Tate 3 in 1971 with a small land holding in the Perth Hills. Within a short period of time the winegrowing potential of the then nascent Margaret River region 4 was recognised by the founders and by 1974 the company had expanded to include operations at Redbrook, situated within the Margaret River district 5 . In the years that followed, the company successfully established a number of key brands which still remain an important element of the business 6 .
Though the Evans name precedes the Tate name in the company's title, the destiny of the company has for the greater part of its lifespan rested with the Tate family, the Evans interests exiting the business in 1983 7 . This dominance was cemented firmly into place in 1987 when Franklin Tate, son of founders John and Toni, joined the company 8 . At that point, the business was a minnow, with annual sales of just $700,000 9 . By 1992, with the business growing rapidly, Franklin Tate was elevated to the role of Managing Director. By 1995, annual sales had reached $5 million then doubled again to $10 million by 1998 10 .
Though the years to 1998 had seen the transformation of the company from minnow to substantial commercial enterprise, the following year represented a watershed in the organisation's history. By 1999 the company had swallowed Margaret River rival Selwyn Wines, owned 260 hectares of prime Margaret River vineyards 11 , two fully equipped wineries 12 and was achieving annual sales of $12 million. Most significantly, Chief Executive and Chairman Franklin Tate determined that the time was ripe to transform the family business into a listed public company.
This was achieved through the execution of a successful, fully subscribed initial public offering which closed in late December 1999, pursuant to which the Tate family sold 42% of their holdings and the company raised a total of $26 million. At the close of the first day of trading, IPO participants had achieved stagging profits in the order of 20%, and the freshly listed company enjoyed a market capitalisation of slightly more than $50 million.
Though the business had experienced rapid growth during the 1990s, that had come off a very low base. Even at the time Evans & Tate made the leap from family to public company, it could still be best thought of as a parochial niche producer. More than 90% of its sales at that stage were restricted to the State of Western Australia 13 . Yet only half a decade later, the firm's asset base would have ballooned approximately tenfold, from $26 million to $272 million 14 and its revenue flows would have increased by a similar factor, from $12 million to $104 million.
In that same period, the company would be transformed from an organisation filled with brash optimism to one so ridden with financial disease as to be a heart beat away from death. The broad brushstrokes of Evans & Tate's trajectory in its post listing era are encapsulated in Tables 1 and 2 below. The first sets out details of the company's revenue and earnings history as a listed vehicle, while the second provides insight into the size of the firm's asset portfolio and financing strategy. Clearly, the story of Evans & Tate between 1999 and 2005 was of rapid and ultimately deeply unhealthy growth. But the firm's growth was of a particular character. As Figure 1 shows, though part of the firm's expansion was organic, the dominant portion of it stemmed from the firm's acquisitiveness.
Specifically, during the period under review, the firm made three acquisitions. First, Selwyn wines, another Margaret River producer, second, Oakridge Estate, a tiny Yarra Valley concern 16 , and finally Cranswick Premium Wines. Figure 1 shows the revenue of each of these acquired firms at the time they were purchased by Evans & Tate, juxtaposed against that firm's total revenue growth between 1999 and 2005.
Figure 1 -Source of Growth
As will be evident from the data above, the firm's post IPO story was dominated by its involvement with a string of acquisitions. However, those acquisitions were not of a consistent character, and one in particular, the 2003 purchase of Cranswick Premium Wines, was of such a magnitude -both in an operational and financial context, that it had the capacity not only to transform Evans & Tate -but also to sow the seeds of that firm's downfall were all not to go to plan. It is to this possibility and the reasons for it that the next section of the paper turns.
A String of Acquisitions
Prior to the initial public offering and acquisition of the Selwyn wine business, Evans & Tate could be best characterised as a vertically integrated 17 boutique producer of premium, super premium and ultra premium branded bottled wine (with greatest emphasis on super premium products) 18 . However, over the course of the next four years, the company metastised into an organism vastly different in scale and emphasis to that which had been profiled to investors in the 1999 IPO.
This change began with the Selwyn acquisition, which Evans & Tate rationalised as a key plank of its strategy to develop a meaningful non branded wine operation 19 . This business differed somewhat to that which the company had previously developed, in that its central economic tenet revolved around volume, not margin.
The Selwyn acquisition also resulted in a vineyard management business being bolted onto the pre existing wine making business, creating a service revenue stream to accompany the company's product based revenue streams 20 . However, on balance, the acquisition was not of a character or of a size which would result either in a fundamental transformation of the Evans & Tate business or result in a significant threat to it.
The total value of the Selwyn transaction, at approximately $6 million was small in comparison to the level of resources available to Evans & Tate. Further, the physical assets acquired (principally vineyards and wineries) were similar in character an physically closely proximate to Evans & Tate's existing operations 21 .
Some further change to the business mix came with the company's subsequent decision to acquire the entities which undertook the distribution of much of its production in key markets. 24 . No data published by the company provides insight into the contribution of this group of businesses as a standalone segment to the overall profit or loss of the Evans & Tate group. However, since these businesses are essentially predicated on assisting the company to sell its own product, it can be assumed that they play a useful, though auxiliary role in the context of the group overall.
After digesting Selwyn, Evans & Tate engaged in two further acquisitions of wine production businesses. The first involved the acquisition of Oakridge Vineyards Limited in 2001. This deal gave Evans & Tate access to a small winemaking facility 25 and vineyard located within the premium Yarra Valley district of Victoria (and thus a degree of geographic diversification), but was otherwise unremarkable 26 . Oakridge was a tiny operation and the total consideration paid to effect its acquisition was in the order of $2 million -a relatively immaterial sum in the context of Evans & Tate's operations at that time.
This lay in stark contrast to the company's acquisition of Cranswick Premium Wines, via a scheme of arrangement completed on 17 March 2003 27 . Cranswick was a volume giant compared to Evans & Tate (even after the incorporation of Selwyn and Oakridge). In the year ending June 30 2002, Cranswick produced over 1.9 million case equivalents and crushed 41,500 tonnes of grapes at its two wineries 28 . Cranswick owned 390 hectares of fully developed vineyards located across sites located mainly in NSW and Victoria 29 -a transcontinental distance from Evans & Tate's key operations. Evans & Tate, by comparison, crushed approximately 7,500 tonnes of grapes and produced approximately 500,000 cases of wine in the same period, and owned developed vineyards less than a quarter of the total size of Cranswick's holdings.
Scale though, was not the chief difference between the two businesses. Indeed, aside from the fact that both organisations produced wine, there were very few points of similarity. Whereas the pre Cranswick Evans & Tate business had defined itself as a dominant player in the very small (though lucrative), highly brand driven Margaret River niche, Cranswick produced downmarket product which appealed to consumers more on price than on any other dimension 30 . Evans & Tate had been a domestic sales success, achieving almost 90% of its sales in Australia 31 , while Cranswick was highly export focused and had built up a viable distribution structure in the United Kingdom and Europe 32 .
Vast distance, differences in scale, production techniques and brand propositions between the Evans & Tate business and Cranswick are all factors which in all likelihood would have conspired to reduce the size of potential synergies arising upon combination of the businesses. However, as troubling as these issues may have been in and of themselves, it was the financial dimensions of the Cranswick acquisition which most strongly signalled the potential for dangerous after effects.
The first announcement that Evans & Tate and Cranswick were in merger negotiations came in early June 2002. By August, Evans & Tate reported that the purchase due diligence process was proceeding well, and that the putative value which would be placed on Cranswick for the purposes of the acquisition would be approximately $57 million.
However, by September, Cranswick had been forced to make a range of embarrassing confessions about its financial position -including that it would make a full year loss of $23 million, having suffered declining revenues, the after effects of the liquidation of its distribution arm and a range of impairments to key asset categories, including inventories and intangibles.
Despite this, and extensive press speculation that Evans & Tate would walk away from the proposed deal in light of these revelations, the fact of Cranswick's wounded position only seems to have hardened the resolve of Evans & Tate to consummate the transaction -albeit at a lower price than had originally been contemplated -the value of the proposed deal being reset to approximately $45 million by late September. Ultimately, it was for this price that Evans & Tate acquired Cranswick the following March -and it is to the detail and context of this transaction that the next section of the paper turns.
Exploring a Killer Deal
Though Evans & Tate attempted to cast its acquisition of Cranswick in a positive light, the truth of the matter, ultimately revealed two years after the consummation of the deal was that it had in fact acquired a business so flawed in a transaction of such scale that its own financial existence was subject to question 33 . Cranswick's business model was to produce and sell high volumes of relatively low margin product, primarily into export markets. While achieving the first of these objectives, the margins it had generated on this business were so thin as to place the long term financial viability of the business in jeopardy.
Thus, in purchasing Cranswick, Evans & Tate had extended itself financially to purchase a firm which controlled impaired brands and was generating negative cashflows by reason of poor working capital management. Prior to its acquisition of Cranswick, Evans & Tate had reported small though consistently positive net cash inflows from operating activities. After the transaction, the firm's cashflow position rapidly haemorrhaged, as margins fell and stock turn remained unacceptably low. The substantial alteration to the Evans & Tate's financial affairs post Cranswick (2003 and after) compared to the pre Cranswick (2002 and before) position is well captured in the data set out in Table 3 below, which includes information pertaining to revenues and margins on a per case sold basis, as well as the over all stock turn position of the firm. The disjuncture between the firm's position pre and post Cranswick is stark. Not only did margins fall dramatically, but the average holding interval for stock widened by an appreciable margin -despite Cranswick being in the business of producing wines not requiring extensive maturation or cellaring prior to sale.
Whatever else might be said about the transaction, it certainly cannot be argued that Evans & Tate could only have been in a position to learn of the poor state of Cranswick's finances until the post completion period. As discussed previously, Cranswick actively signalled its situation soon after Evans & Tate began merger talks, by reporting a very substantial operating loss, negative cashflows from operations and material inventory and intangible asset impairments.
These were unlikely to have been transient events -on the contrary, they were anchored firmly in a series of industry trends whose momentum and import ought to have been obvious to all who chose to contemplate them. Data published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (set out in Table 4 , below) tells an eloquent tale of an industry gripped by increasing competition on one side while dogged by sustained overproduction on the other. This, combined with a fundamental reshaping of the liquor retailing in scene in Australia, such that market power was dramatically transferred from producers to two key retail groups which had grown their share of the trade tenfold over the space of less than a decade spelt a period of substantial turmoil even for well financially balanced operators. Thus, all other things being equal, the better view of the transaction must be that Evans & Tate pursued the matter with its eyes wide open. This raises serious questions about the strength of the control and governance systems and processes in place at Evans & Tate in its post IPO period, and whether these had changed sufficiently substantially to measure up to the challenges associated with the firm's 1999 metamorphosis from family owned to public corporation. Arguably, the lack of a strong capacity to rationalise the Cranswick acquisition on either operational or financial grounds suggests that an alternate explanation for the deal lies in the phenomenon of governance failure.
Of course, the quality of a firm's governance is inherently more difficult to judge, especially only with the benefit of publicly available information, than dimensions of an organisation's performance such as the financial outcomes it generates. Yet enough circumstantial evidence in relation to quality of Evans & Tate's governance does exist to facilitate contemplation of the impact of this matter on the decision trajectory exhibited by the firm.
Review of the available evidence suggests several areas for concern. The first of these is the apparently unchallenged position of Evans & Tate's cornerstone shareholder, chief executive officer and board chair, Franklin Tate. Having assumed the role of CEO in 1992, Tate also took on the task of chairing the company's board from 1999 onwards.
The board he assembled was small in size (fluctuating between just four or five members in total) and poorly balanced. Tate was the only executive director, and to ensure the continuity of his capacity to control the board, his wife Heather acted as an alternate non executive director. Further, the skill mix brought to the table by the board's members was constrained -dominated by those with a legal background, but devoid of strong financial, industry and marketing experience. This weakness at the board level seems also to have been replicated in critical areas of the firm's internal management. For example, between November 2003 and January 2006, the firm had four different CFOs, an unusual degree of turnover in such a critical role. Further, the lack of strong board financial experience coupled with a lack of continuity in the CFO role may have rendered Evans & Tate less capable of independently assessing the nature of advice tendered to it by key outside stakeholders, such as its primary creditor, ANZ bank, which was directly and indirectly involved in all of the acquisition transactions undertaken by the firm in its post IPO guise.
In particular, it seems relevant to note that ANZ had been a creditor to the financially weak Australian Premium Wines when in 1999 it assisted Cranswick to purchase that company, and was a creditor to both financially weakened Cranswick This dominant lending and advisory role serves at very least to raise questions about the possibility that there existed asymmetries between the motivations of ANZ and Evans & Tate in entering into the string of transactions which both were mutually involved in, and, given the apparent weaknesses in latter's internal financial functions, the capacity of Evans & Tate to conserve its own interests in the face of the advice tendered to it.
Overall then, the available evidence seems to suggest that the dominant motivation for the transaction undertaken was the pursuit of growth. Evans & Tate chairman and chief executive Franklin Tate appears to have become intent on rapidly expanding the ambit of the firm's operations on a range of key dimensions (product portfolio, geographic scope, market reach) within a highly constrained time span. This desire led to the creation of a deep chasm between ambition and the resources available within the organisation to fuel the fulfilment of that ambition. It was a void which would, by necessity, be filled by debt propelled acquisition activity.
Elementary analysis suggests that during the three year period spanning the Cranswick acquisition (2002 -2004) , Evans & Tate's sustainable growth rate averaged 3.23% per annum, while over the same period, the firm's actual rate of expansion lay close to 50% per annum. Debt financing, almost exclusively provided and facilitated by ANZ provided the means of bridging the resulting financial voidyet, as has been demonstrated above, this significant increase in appetite for financial and operational risk came at a time when the market for Evans & Tate's products was being buffeted by an almost perfect storm.
The dangers associated with driving growth at rates substantially in excess of sustainable limits, rapid increases in leverage and the distractions associated with the need to manage large one off transactions such as acquisitions would normally be expected to place internal governance mechanisms on notice and elicit a counterbalancing response.
Yet in the case of Evans & Tate, it appears that this simply was not a meaningful possibility. The firm suffered from poor management systems and controls -particularly in the key area of financial management. Meanwhile at board level, the range of skills required to effectively critique the quality of outside advice (e.g from principal creditors) and understand its ramifications was severely limited. There was no functioning counterweight to the influence of Franklin Tate -architect of the firm's strategy, cornerstone shareholder, chief executive officer and board chair. The rest, as they say, is history.
Conclusions
It is well known that acquisition transactions can represent a moment of considerable danger for those firms which use them as a method of embarking on a high growth trajectory. Largely however, the literature which has contemplated the propensity of acquisition transactions to result in value destruction for acquiring parties has not extended to a contemplation of value destruction so profound that it has the effect of threatening the ongoing financial viability of the acquiring party.
In distinction to most pre-existing literature, this paper has focused on this possibility in particular, and some of the phenomena which might prove responsible for its existence, of which three in particular emerge from the case analysis above. First, the financial condition of the target firm at the time the acquisition takes place. Second, industry conditions and trends contemporaneous with the acquisition, and third, the quality of the internal governance processes which act as a check and balance on deal proposals brought to the acquiring firm's board both by interested internal and external stakeholders.
Of these, we propose the third as the most important, since effective governance review would arguably result either in deal avoidance or appropriate price protection in relation to deals proposed where either or both of our first two nominated phenomena presented.
In the case of Evans & Tate however, it appears that there was little opportunity for effective checks and balances being brought to bear on deal proposals. In that firm, a dominant chief executive and board chair bent on growth found an ally in a financial services provider no doubt content to generate growing fee streams while assisting the fulfilment of that desire in conditions where neither other directors or internal finance executives appear to have been in a position to offer an effective counterbalance.
It may well have been the case that neither the Selwyn nor Oakridge acquisitions which pre-dated the Cranswick deal the subject of this analysis represented transactions motivated by a cogent investment thesis. Individually however, this would have been of relatively little importance in terms of the survival prospects for the acquiring firm, since both transactions were very small in scale.
The Cranswick deal was of a markedly different character. As a target, it was large in size compared to Evans & Tate. It had a highly geared balance sheet, poor cashflows and a portfolio of chronically underperforming assets. Its key operations were geographically remote from those of the acquiring business. Its customers were profoundly different in terms of their location, their product and pricing preferences. Being a primarily export oriented business, Cranswick was exposed to a plethora of risks (for example currency risk) which would not have impacted the almost wholly domestically focused Evans & Tate business to any meaningful degree prior to the acquisition. And of course, the key competitors of the Cranswick business were not only far larger than the key competitors to the more boutique Evans & Tate operation -but also to be found all over the new world.
That so many obvious risk factors existed and would have been evident to a dispassionate observer contemporaneously with the consummation of the transaction raises serious questions about how such a deal could have been executed -for their exists an enormous gulf between a dangerous deal proposal, and a dangerous deal actually done. Our analysis has led us to the conclusion that the primary explanation for the fact of this deal was Evans & Tate's lack of, for want of a better term, a functioning immune system.
Where swarms of directors armed with pertinent questions about the strategy underpinning the transaction, its risk characteristics, financial simulations showing base case, worse case and best case scenarios for the impact of the transaction and the like should normally have surrounded the chief executive and his coterie of bankers and prevented their forward motion until satisfactory answers had been providedthere were none. There was nothing, in other words, to prevent the ingestion of pathogens into the body corporate. Once that state of affairs came into being, it was only a matter of time until opportunistic parasites happened upon and exploited a compromised host.
In this paper, we have scrutinised just one case in detail. However, this detailed contemplation has led us towards the development of propositions amenable for empirical testing aimed at the end of more comprehensively understanding the killer acquisition phenomenon.
In particular, we posit that firms with higher levels of turnover in key financial management positions -particularly the position of Chief Financial Officer, with unbalanced boards, with high reliance on a single financial services provider and with high CEO power concentration are more likely to be susceptible to this form of risk phenomenon than firms which do not share these characteristics. In consequence, it would be to these factors that we would suggest future researchers turn their attention as they seek to expand the boundaries of knowledge on the subject.
